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Abstract

The People’s Republic of China is an indispensable political and economic force in Asia. With
the majority of the United States’ foreign economic interests invested in the Asia-Pacific region,
the leading role that China is taking is a major concern. The Asia-Pacific region is strategically
important to the US. How US policy makers craft foreign policy toward Asia has a direct impact
on US involvement in the region. Unless the US becomes more invested in Asia, develops a
comprehensive understanding of China’s role in the region, and proactively pursue strategic
relationships, US influence in Asian affairs will become a thing of the past. This paper will
explore the growing economic role that China is playing in the Asia region, and provide future
foreign policy recommendations for the US government.
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China and the New Asia:
Policy Recommendations

“We cannot enter into alliances until we are acquainted with the designs of our neighbors.”
-Sun Tzu, Art of War

Over the past several years, China has become one of the most influential and powerful
nation sates in the world, and has become an indispensable economic force in Asia. China’s
increased political activism and involvement in Asia is rapidly overshadowing US influence in
the region, and the leading role that China is taking is a major concern. An increase in assertive
and defiant Chinese attitudes toward US presence in Asia is a threat to US foreign policy. Unless
significant policy changes are made that reflect recognition of China’s strategic role in the
region, US influence in Asia will become insignificant. In order for the US to have a realistic,
practical foreign policy toward China, US policy makers must have a comprehensive
understanding of how China interacts with various countries in Asia on a local and regional
level. The US government must recognize China’s leading role in the region, and develop a
comprehensive strategy where the US can “help influence the direction that China takes in its
new role.”1
For middle power and third world countries in the Asia region, China’s economic rise has
been viewed in a positive light. The current Obama administration has publically promised to
reengage with the Asia region. However, US influence and involvement in foreign affairs has
1

Ralph A. Cossa, Brad Glosserman, Michael A. Mcevitt, Nirav Patel, James Przystup, and Brad Roberts,
The United States and the Asia-Pacific Region: Security Strategy for the Obama Administration (Washington, DC:
Center for New American Security, 2009), 52.
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been stretched throughout the western and eastern hemisphere, limiting the resources that can be
focused on the Asia region. The US must learn to strike a delicate balance between allocating
their resources wisely in order to maintain a constant presence in the Asia region, without
appearing to be an overbearing power interfering with the sovereignty of countries in the region.
Although it may be impossible for China and the US to become allies in the near future, if US
policy makers can make well informed decisions, hostile relations between the two countries can
be avoided and Beijing and Washington can become strategic economic partners. The US must
pursue strategic relationships among the core countries in the Asia region, recognizing that
China’s relationship with its neighbors ultimately affect how Beijing relates to Washington.
Although China will not surpass the US economy in the near future, China is and will continue to
be a leading economic power house in the Asia region, and continue to largely contribute to the
global market. This paper will investigate China’s rise and its strategic role in the Asia region,
and provide future strategic foreign policy recommendations for the US government.

The Significance of the Asia Region
The Rise of China
China is arguably becoming one of the most important countries in the Asia-Pacific
region. With the strengthening of the People’s Liberation Army, and the nation’s growing
population, Western powers are becoming increasingly concerned about the country’s foreign
policy intentions. However, in sharp contrast to former president Jiang Zemin, current Chinese
President Hu Jintao is practicing a more flexible and open form of foreign policy, which China
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has never displayed in the past.2 The driving force “… behind Chinese foreign policy under Hu
has been the need to access energy and raw materials to support China’s rapid economic
growth.”3 However, Hu has recognized that a healthy relationship between the US and China is
crucial to improving and developing the Asia-Pacific region.4 In January 2011, during a speech
at the US-China Business Council in Washington, Hu presented a five-point diplomatic plan
encouraging greater cooperation between China and the US.5 During the speech, Hu promised
that “China would ‘never seek hegemony or pursue an expansionist policy’ in foreign affairs.”6
The Chinese seem to understand that the Sino-US relationship is based on “cooperation and
friendship,” yet is “complicated and challenging.”7 Although China has been diplomatic in its
relations with its strategic partners as of date, there is concern over how far China is going to
exert its growing power over nations if resources become a rare commodity. For example, China
“controls more than 90% of current global supply of rare-earth metals …” and have begun to
stockpile their ample supply of them, while simultaneously reducing exports to countries that
need them.8 Beijing introduced a plan last year that would allow state run companies to merge
industries and modify exports, which would drive up the prices.9 This should be of concern to the
US because according to the Pentagon, “while only 5% of demand for rare-earth metals in the
2

“China and Northeast Asia- External Affairs,” Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment, 2009,
http://sentinel.janes.com. (accessed March 27, 2009).
3
“China and Northeast Asia- External Affairs,” Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment.
4
Bob David and Patrick O’Conner, “Lawmakers Try, Fail to Pin Down Hu,” The Wall Street Journal,
January 21, 2011, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704881304576093830120490372.html.
(accessed Feb 26, 2011).
5
Ibid.
6
Ibid.
7
Le Yucheng, “Harmonious Relationship,” China Daily, Jan 31, 2011,
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/opinion/2011-01/31/content_11943162.htm. (accessed Mar 29, 2011).
8
James T. Areddy, “China Moves to Strengthen Grip Over Supply of Rare-Earth Metals,” Wall Street
Journal, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704124504576117511251161274.html (accessed Mar 29,
2011).
9
David Barboza, “China Weighs Tighter Controls on Rare Elements,” New York Times, June 2, 2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/03/business/energy-environment/03rare.html. (accessed Mar 29, 2011).
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U.S. comes from the military, the U.S. is nevertheless ‘completely reliant on China for the
production of some of [the Pentagon's] most powerful weapons.’"10
With the majority of US foreign interests invested in the Asia-Pacific region, the leading
role that China is taking in the region should be causing major concern. America should not
ignore the Asia-Pacific region for the following reasons: First, the region’s economic role is
strategically important, generating “30 percent of global exports,”11 and holding “two-thirds of
global foreign exchange reserves.”12 Second, China owns “more than $1trillion of US debt,”13
and holds over “$3 trillion in foreign reserves.”14 Globalization has caused nations to become
closely intertwined, and the countries with the largest populations, natural resources, and
economic advantage, such as China, South Korea and India, are rapidly taking the lead in Asia.
China, Asia’s largest communist nation, and the region’s largest capitalist country, is playing a
significant role in economic growth in the region.
As Beijing expands its influence in Asia, the US’ relationship with China has become
increasingly important. This year, China officially claimed the status of the world’s second
largest economy, overtaking Japan’s 40 year hold on the position.15 China’s rapid growth and
political leverage is seen among many Western states as a threat to Asia. However, Asian
countries that economically depend on China for their resources and financial investments see
China’s growth as an opportunity to increase their financial revenue. China actively invests in its

10

David Barboza, “China Weighs Tighter Controls on Rare Elements.”
Cossa, et. al. The United States and the Asia-Pacific Region, 3.
12
Shaun Narine, “From Conflict to Collaboration: Institution-building in East Asia,” Behind The Headlines
65, no. 5 (2008): 2.
13
Ibid., 3.
14
Ibid., 2.
15
Justin McCurry and Julia Kollewe, “China overtakes Japan’s world’s second-largest economy,”
Guardian.co.uk, Feb 14, 2011, http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2011/feb/14/china-second-largest-economy.
(accessed April 3, 2011).
11
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neighbors, recognizing the importance of capitalizing on other’s natural resources. Asian
countries in the Southeast Asia region are predicted to grow an average of 6.8% by 2012,
positively correlating with the projected numbers for China’s growth.16 For Asian countries, a
decline in Chinese growth would have devastating effects.
The annual increase of China’s overseas direct investment (ODI) is a good example of
how heavily Beijing is investing in the Asia region. The Chinese standard when dealing with
foreign countries is very lax, demonstrating a willingness to do business with corrupt
governments and underdeveloped countries with unstable legal structures.17 This provides
Beijing with a much wider portfolio and more investing opportunities than the US, who is very
cautious when it comes to business dealings with foreign business and governments.18 China is
invested in over 180 countries, and its ODI is mainly focused on the service industry, natural
resources, and technology.19 An analysis of China’s foreign direct investment shows that Beijing
has been increasingly focusing on infrastructure projects, and “ranks first among developing
countries, and 5th among all countries” in infrastructure investments.20 This type of ODI
investment is vastly different from the US portfolio which focuses on outsourcing and accessing
foreign markets.21 These trends are significant because every investment that the Chinese make
is “aimed at strengthening production at home.”22 In 2009, China’s Export-Import Bank lent over

16

“China’s economy will continue to drive Asian growth,” Economist Intelligence Unit, March 16, 2011,
http://gfs.eiu.com/Article.aspx?articleType=rf&articleId=1147886899&secId=3. (accessed Mar 24, 2011).
17
Le, “Harmonious Relationship.”
18
Ibid.
19
Yiping Huang, “Traps for Chinese investment overseas,” East Asia Forum, Sept 10, 2010,
http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2010/09/10/traps-for-chinese-investment-overseas/. (accessed Mar 25, 2011).
20
Huang, “Traps for Chinese investment overseas.”
21
Le, “Harmonious Relationship.”
22
Ibid.
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$174.2 billion, investing in agriculture and natural resources around the world.23 In contrast, The
World Bank lent only one fourth that amount in 2009.24
China is the world’s largest exporter and manufacturer, and with a booming economy,
China attracts a large amount of Foreign Direct Investment from various countries.25 In an effort
to capitalize on investment opportunities in the PRC, “China received about 20 percent of all FDI
to developing countries over the last 10 years.”26 Over 50 percent of China’s exports and imports
are a result of foreign invested enterprises.27 In addition, the local sales of products made by US
companies located within China grew 431 percent “between 2000 and 2008.”28 Moreover, “more
than 90 percent of sales by US majority-owned companies operating in China over the last
decade were to China or other foreign markets, with a mere 8 percent being exported back to the
United States.”29 Needless to say, economic trade with China has become a crucial element of
growth and profit for the US economy and US owned businesses. With investments in
agricultural and resources, China is leaving footprints all across Asia, indirectly influencing
domestic policies in various countries as a result.
On March 5, 2011 Premier Wen Jiabao announced his country’s economic growth target
during the opening assembly of the National People’s Congress. For 2011, Wen announced that

23

Lindsey Eckelmann, “Complex Connections: Ecological Impacts of Chinese Investment in Southeast
Asia,” Wilson Center, Oct 20, 2010,
http://www.wilsoncenter.org/ondemand/index.cfm?fuseaction=home.play&mediaid=EE526568-D563-35500D8643B908AD3697. (accessed 21 March 2011).
24
Ibid.
25
The World Bank, “Securing the Present, Shaping the Future,” World Bank East Asia and Pacific
Economic Update 2011 Vol. 1, 21 Mar 2011, 6,
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTEAPHALFYEARLYUPDATE/Resources/5501921300567391916/EAP_Update_March2011_fullreport.pdf, (accessed Mar 24, 2011).
26
World Bank, “Foreign Direct Investment-the China Story,” July 17, 2010,
http://go.worldbank.org/HNQ2VVW7H0. (accessed Mar 25, 2011).
27
Ibid.
28
US Business Council, “US-China Trade Policy: Issues and Solutions.”
29
Ibid.
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China will aim to increase its economic growth by “around 8 percent.”30 This is the same modest
target amount that was set in 2010, where China’s real GDP growth increased from 9.2% in 2009
to 10.3% in 2010.31 Although China’s GDP growth is predicted to fall below 9% by 2012, these
numbers are significantly higher than US GDP growth which is expected to fall below 3% by
2012.32 In 2009, China was America’s “third-largest export market for goods” and the numbers
released for 2010 have completely surpassed those of 2009.33 These numbers have generated
unwarranted fears that China will overtake the US in the near future.
Some researchers have predicted that China may overtake the US as the worlds’ largest
economy in the next twenty years.34 However, these predictions are merely based on China’s
economic trends over the past 30 to 60 years. The China that will exist in 2040 will be vastly
different from the China in 1979, just as the China in 1979 was different from the China of
1949.35 Any number of events, nature or man-made, could drastically alter China’s internal
order. Forecasting too far ahead, especially in regards to such a large communist nation as China
can prove to be pointless. If the PRC’s demographic trends, economic growth, and GDP data is
analyzed correctly, one can conclude that it is highly unlikely that China will surpass the US
economy in the near future. Although China is the largest capitalist nation in the region, its core
is still driven by deep communist policies. The Chinese economic growth is closely monitored
30

Andrew Higgins, “Chinese Parliament Opens With Grand Pledges,” The Washington Post, March 5, 2011
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/03/04/AR2011030406785.html?wpisrc=nl_cuzhead.
(accessed March 5, 2011).
31
“China’s economy will continue to drive Asian growth,” Economist Intelligence Unit.
32
Economist Intelligence Unit, “Global Outlook Summary,” March 12, 2011, Economist Intelligence Unit
Limited 2011, March 12, 2011, gfs.eiu.com, 4. (accessed Mar 24, 2011).
33
US-China Business Council, “US-China Trade Policy: Issues and Solutions,” Testimony of the US-China
Business Council, before the House Committee on Ways and Means, United States Senate, Feb 9, 2011.
(Washington, DC), 1, http://www.uschina.org/public/documents/2011/02/china_trade_policy.pdf.
34
The World Bank, “World Bank East Asia and Pacific Economic Update,” 6.
35
Derek Scissors, “10 China Myths for the New Decade,” Jan 28, 2010, The Heritage Foundation,
http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2010/01/10-China-Myths-for-the-New-Decade, (accessed 22 Mar 2011).
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and restricted by the state government, and if reforms in the system are not made, it will
inevitably lead to an economic halt, destabilizing the country’s industrial drive.
Another reason that China will most likely not overtake the US economy is the country’s
demographics. China’s favorable demographics of the working class have contributed to its
increased growth over the past few decades. However, over the next 30 years or so, the Chinese
population will begin to age, and reflect statistics and an environment that is more reminiscent of
Japans current aging population.36 If current trends continue, China’s working-age population
will decline from the overpowering 47 percent in 1985 to merely 26 percent in 2030.37 China’s
real GDP growth is also often misinterpreted. GDP growth is what is generally used to measure
a country’s economic contribution and expansion. Instead of significantly leading the world in
economic growth, China actually “detracts from the rest of the world’s growth in gross domestic
product (GDP).”38 At first glance, because China has a large amount of trade surplus, China
appears to be the leading global power in economic growth in GDP. However, trade surplus
merely “adds to GDP and a trade deficit takes away from it.”39 Therefore, due to China’s
overwhelming trade surplus, “the rest of the world runs a large trade deficit with the PRC.”40
Americans have become privy to the politicization of information, and have become
increasingly pessimistic of America’s leading economic role in the world, becoming weary of
China’s growing influence in world politics and in the international marketplace. When
Americans were asked what country they believed was the “leading economic power in the
world today,” and were asked to choose between the US, the European Union, Russia, China,
36

Scissors, “10 China Myths for the New Decade.”
Ibid.
38
Ibid.
39
Ibid.
40
Ibid.
37
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Japan, and India, 52% of the respondents said China, while only 32% answered the United
States.41 Public perception plays an important part in politics and government morale. Although
the US is still the world’s leading power, it appears that “the majority of Americans believe the
U.S. has already lost the challenge.”42 Another poll conducted by the Pew Research Center, the
Washington Post, and ABC news also validated this concern when 61% of respondents
considered “China as a threat to jobs and economic security.”43 It seems that Americans are no
longer confident that the US will continue to play a strong role in foreign affairs. Although
China will not surpass the US economy in the near future, China is and will continue to be a
leading economic power house in the Asia region, and continue to largely contribute to the
global market. Although the global benefit of economic cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region is
tremendous, the region’s restrictions on capitalism and open markets could hinder the global
economy in the long run.44
In an op-ed by a member of China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, US Secretary of State
Hillary Clinton was quoted as saying that although China and the US are “walking on different
roads,” they are headed “to the same destination with a shared future and responsibilities.”45 The
author of this op-ed integrated Hillary Clinton’s comment with his own thoughts, concluding that
“selfish interests” should not get in the way of the growing cooperative Sino-US relationship.46
The author, however, did not define or specify what he meant by selfish interests. The US and
China have very different cultures, values, and history of government. The bilateral relationship
41

Lydia Saad, “China Surges in American’s Views of Top World Economy,” Feb 14, 2011, Gallup, Mar
21, 2011, http://www.gallup.com/poll/146099/china-surges-americans-views-top-world-economy.aspx. (accessed
April 3, 2011).
42
Ibid.
43
Ibid.
44
Cossa et.al., The United States and the Asia-Pacific Region, 7.
45
Yucheng, “Harmonious Relationship.”
46
Ibid.
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among the two nations will always be driven by the host country’s national security interests. If
the author is hoping that both countries will put aside their own nations’ interests when
negotiating and dealing with each other, he is unaware of the true nature of the current state of
affairs.
US Involvement
After the Cold War, with the threat of Communism suppressed, many Americans
believed it was no longer necessary to invest politically, economically, and militarily in the AsiaPacific region. Fortunately, however, the US was aware that stifling Communist expansionism
was leaving a deep and dangerous void in Asia that was going to be filled by either another
ideology or a hegemonic nation. Thus, America sought to utilize their profitable relationships in
Southeast Asia to help stabilize the region and promote democratic values. US military presence
in the region post WWII and post Cold War helped stabilize Asia, allowing Asian nations to
focus solely on rebuilding their government and growing economically without concerning
themselves with security threats. For example, the US placed permanent military troops in Japan,
securing a stronger relationship between the two countries, and providing assurance for the
Japanese that they would be protected if they were attacked by a foreign power. The US also led
diplomatic discussions and the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty in an effort to discourage
Russian expansion. The Japan-America Security Alliance, the Korea-America Security Alliance,
and the Australia-New Zealand-United States treaty are also just a few examples of security
agreements that have reassured Asia of US interests and presence in the region.47

47

Chin Kin Wah and Pang Eng Fong, “Relating the U.S.-Korea and U.S.-Japan Alliances to Emerging Asia
Pacific multilateral Processes: An ASEAN Perspective,” Shorenstein APARC, (March 2000), 24,
http://aparc.stanford.edu/publications/relating_the_uskorea_and_usjapan_alliances_to_emerging_asia_pacific_multi
lateral_processes_an_asean_perspective/. (accessed Mar 25, 2011)
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Shortly after the tragic terrorist attack of September 11, 2001, the US government
expressed a renewed interest in Southeast Asia. Former President George W. Bush declared that
“Southeast Asia was the second front in the global war on terrorism.” 48 This second front,
however, was short-lived. Due to the recent US economic crisis and increased focus on
counterterrorism efforts in the Middle East, American interests and investment in the AsiaPacific region have been moved to the periphery. There has been an increased focus on
strengthening multilateral ties and engaging in dialogue exclusively among Asian nations, which
has quietly begun to alienate America from input in the region. It is in the US’ national security
interests to encourage and promote a secure non-threatening environment in Asia that will
benefit the US. However, it is impossible for the US to pursue an effective foreign policy plan if
policy makers in Washington are not intimately aware of the geopolitical trends of the region,
and how it affects US national security. US foreign interests need to be refocused, reevaluated,
and readjusted to the new evolving environment in order for the US to fulfill its national security
objectives and pursue the nation’s best interest in the region. It is crucial to understand China’s
significant relationship with its geopolitical neighbors, and its influence over Asia’s political,
military, and economic policies. With the majority of the US foreign economic interests invested
in the Asia-Pacific region, the leading role that China is taking in the region is a major concern.
China’s Role in the Region
China’s Worldview
China has a very different view of international relations and foreign policy compared to
the West. Rosemary Foot explained the situation well when she described China’s view of the

48

Donald E. Weatherbee, International Relations in Southeast Asia: The Struggle for Autonomy,
(Rowmand & Littlefield Publishers, Inc, 2005), 1.
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world as a “… concentration on trends in world politics, a concern to be taken seriously as a peer
by dominant states, and a felt need to express a leadership role towards the developing world.”49
Chinese understanding of globalization also reflects its future goals and global aspirations.
According to an article in International Security, the Chinese define globalization as “… there
are no absolute winners or absolute losers’ and implies that we do not live in a ‘zerosum’
world.”50 For US policy makers, understanding the Chinese definition of globalization is
important because it sheds light on the fact that the Chinese see negative aspects of a market
based economy and international involvement. For Beijing, some aspects of globalization are
seen as negative because their nation—especially their financial market place—is vulnerable and
affected by the stability or instability of other nations.51 On the other hand, global trading can
also be used as leverage for influencing international affairs. The US is so closely connected to
China that Beijing’s economic investment can “act as a restraint on US power.”52
The Chinese mindset of treating the region and its countries as one entity (tianxia) has
been very successful in regards to multilateral arrangements in Asia. One reason for this is when
small nations ally themselves with China, they believe that they no longer have to fear China
trying to “mold them into their image.” America often requires drastic changes such as halting
human rights violations, or insisting on major democratic reforms, before they are willing to
partner with foreign countries. China, on the other hand, openly engages in business dealings
with corrupt governments, consequently able to build a wider and more global economic
49

Rosemary Foot, "Chinese Strategies in a US-Hegemonic Global Order: Accommodating and Hedging."
International Affairs 82, no. 1 (2006): 79
http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=aph&AN=19495911&site=ehost-live, (accessed Feb 7,
2011).
50
Foot, "Chinese Strategies in a US-Hegemonic Global Order," 82.
51
Ibid.
52
Ibid.
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portfolio than the US. In addition, when US policy makers focus solely on larger nations in the
region, it communicates to the surrounding countries that they are not as important. Although
Washington cannot completely ignore human rights abuses or disregard governmental
corruption, the US must create a more robust foreign policy strategy that is prepared to deal with
the complex dynamics of the region.
Taiwan: Chinese vs. US Policy
Currently, one of the most important and disputed topics in Chinese relations is the
delicate and tense diplomatic and military dance between Mainland China and Taiwan. This has
resulted in a cultivation of feelings of resistance toward US presence in the region and hostility
towards America’s attempt to intervene in China’s domestic affairs. This anti-American shift is a
threat to US foreign policy, and could cause major damage to US presence and influence in the
region. Chinese officials have publically criticized US policies numerous times on issues of vital
US interests, especially in regards to Taiwan. For example, China’s foreign minister Jiang Yu
made a public statement about the selling of arms to Taiwan: “We urge the US to clearly
recognize the severe consequences of arms sales to Taiwan and adhere to the three Sino-US joint
communiqués, especially the principles established in the Joint Communiqué on August 17,
1982."53 The Chinese believe that this communiqué clearly does not allow for the US to continue
selling arms to Taiwan. However, a close examination of the document shows the Taiwan arms
issues was not resolved between President Ronald Reagan and Chinese Premier Zhao Ziyang.
The second point of the communiqué reads: “The question of United States arms sales to Taiwan
was not settled in the course of negotiations between the two countries on establishing

53

Armen Hareyan, “US China Hostility Tops The 2010 List of Risks,” Huliq, Jan 7, 2010,
http://www.huliq.com/1/90196/us-china-hostility-tops-2010-list-risks. (accessed Mar 21 2011).
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diplomatic relations. The two sides held differing positions, and the Chinese side stated that it
would raise the issue again following normalization. Recognizing that this issue would seriously
hamper the development of United States-China relations, they have held further discussions on
it, during and since the meetings….”54
For years, the US has naively held a contradictory China—Taiwan policy. America has
continued to pursue a “one China” policy, discouraging Chinese aggression toward Taiwan,
while simultaneously selling defensive weapons to Taipei through the Taiwan Relations Act. The
“one China” policy prevents Washington from intervening in Taiwan-China relations, even if it
is in US interests.55 The Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), passed by Congress in 1979,
demonstrated US commitment towards Taiwan, and has contributed to the creation of a quasially relationship between Washington and Taipei.56 Politicians in Washington must realize that
the meaning of “one China” is significantly different when used in America and China. To the
PRC, it means stifling advancement, creativity, and progress, and subjugating the people of
Taiwan to the historical communist state of China.57 When the US promotes a “one China”
policy in diplomatic and political circles, they are hoping to communicate the desire for a
peaceful compromise and a world where communism and democracy can live together under a
flexible government. In the “Shanghai Communiqué,” President Nixon agreed that “there is only
one China and that Taiwan is a part of China.”58 According to Nixon, the Shanghai
Communiqué allowed Washington and Beijing to “temporarily set aside the ‘crucial question
54

Nuclear Threat Initiative, “Sino-US Joint Communiqué,” August 17, 1982, http://www.nti.org/index.php.
(accessed 21 Mar 2011).
55
John J. Tkacik Jr., ed. “Reshaping the Taiwan Strait.” The Heritage Foundation (Washington, DC,
2007), 188.
56
Ibid., 7.
57
Ibid., 187.
58
U.S. Department of State, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, “Background Note: China,” 2010,
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/18902.htm. (accessed Feb 23, 2011).
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obstructing the normalization of relations.’”59 To endorse freedom, democracy, and peace, and
help other countries secure these ideals for their own country, the US must learn when to
intervene in another country’s affairs, and when to refrain. US policy toward Taiwan and China
must be realistic and achievable, and have its national interest always in mind. However,
promoting democracy and freedom is always in America’s national interest.
There has been a dramatic increase in Taiwanese self-identification, and Chinese hostility has
further increased the unity of the island. The Chinese people's identity has begun to wane, and
the people of Taiwan have begun to distinguish themselves as Taiwanese. Author J. Bruce
Jacobs appropriately refers to this trend as the “Taiwanisation” of Taiwan.60 In 1992, the
Election Study Center at National Chengchi University began to conduct a survey to study the
trend of nationalization in Taiwan. By 2004, the respondents who answered that they were
“Taiwanese” only, rather than “Chinese,” increased two and a half times.61 In 2005, the Gallup
Organization conducted a worldwide survey consisting of ordinary citizens and world leaders,
and discovered that more than 60% of those surveyed “saw Taiwan and China as two separate
countries.”62
China is entirely opposed to Taiwan independence and its desire to join the UN as an
independent state.63 According to Chinese official documents, the Taiwan issue has already been
solved, and Taiwan is currently considered as China’s 23rd province.64 China is already heavily
invested in Taiwan, and has a strong national interest in keeping the state stable. For example the
59

U.S. Department of State, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, “Background Note: China.”
Tkacik Jr e.d., “Reshaping the Taiwan Strait,” 173.
61
Ibid., 175.
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Ibid., 179.
63
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PRC and Hong Kong contribute to 40% of Taiwan’s exports.65 According to China’s National
Defense White Paper in 2008, “The attempts of the separatist forces for "Taiwan independence"
to seek "de jure Taiwan independence" have been thwarted, and the situation across the Taiwan
Straits has taken a significantly positive turn.”66 On the other hand, in the same report, “separatist
forces seeking ‘Taiwan Independence’” are listed as one of the major security threats to the
country. 67
Operating under the assumption that Taiwan is already a part of China, Beijing has used
its resources, political influence, and leverage to isolate Taiwan from joining important
international organizations and participating in vital global conferences as an independent
country whenever possible.68 For example, China has limited Taiwan’s participation in the AsiaPacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), rejected its request to join the United Nations and the
World Health Organization as an independent state, and has aggressively implored foreign
nations to support a “One China principle.”69 China has been unwilling to budge on their policy
toward Taiwan, as was evidenced in Hu’s recent speech where he stated that their relationship
with Taiwan “concern China's sovereignty and territorial integrity" and represent China's "core
interest."70 China has increased “the numbers of short-range ballistic missiles aimed at Taiwan”
and has also invested money and resources into improving and empowering its blue water
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navy.71 Not only has China been increasing its military capabilities, it is also utilizing political
pressures to subjugate Taiwan. In 2005, an Anti-Succession Law was passed in China, banning
any speech in favor of Taiwan independence.72 China has also aggressively attempted to isolate
Taiwan from the rest of the world, discouraging foreign countries from developing diplomatic
relationships with Taiwan by offering monetary incentives such as foreign aid.73 Taiwan’s
unofficial status and Beijing’s insistence on a “one China” policy has prevented Taipei from
improving its international status and economic relations with strategic neighbors. In addition,
although Taiwan has been able to build official relations with several pacific nations such as the
Solomon and Marshall Islands, relations with these “failed states” have not proven to be
mutually beneficial.74 Recognizing the importance of Taiwan’s contributions to the region, the
US must discourage the spread of communism, and promote the growth of democracy by
example. This can be done through encouraging other nations to partner with Taiwan
economically and cooperate in various global efforts such as counterterrorism.75
Predicting that Beijing and Moscow would most likely retaliate with military force,
Washington has continually urged Taiwan to refrain from seeking independence as doing so
would cause major damage and instability in the region.76 China has maintained a strong “oneChina policy,” and has sought regional support on the issue.77 China has become more
aggressive and manipulative in its policy against Taiwan, and until the circumstances are
resolved, the “pressure” and “strong suggestions” that the ASEAN Regional Forum makes in
71
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recommendation of China’s actions will not change China’s mind. “Such is the constitutive
power of Chinese realism, which enables China to change while actively fashioning the world in
her own image.”78
Taiwan’s democratic government and free market policies have created a gateway for
positive US influence in the region. Nevertheless, Washington has continued to publicly support
Beijing, a communist authoritarian-totalitarian regime, while downplaying democratic Taiwan’s
quest for independence.79 China has become a major political and military power in Asia, and
the risks of supporting an independent Taiwan has significantly increased. According to former
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, the US is responsible for keeping China’s growth from
becoming a threat to the region.80 Interestingly, for US policy makers, supporting a democratic
and independent Taiwan is not considered as one of the options for decreasing China’s threat in
the region.
Why Taiwan?
Despite Washington’s seemingly apathetic attitude, the US should have a significant
interest in Taiwan remaining separate from communist China, and maintaining its own
democratic government. China’s economic growth, however, has provided Beijing with the
ability to use “soft power” to encourage their neighbors to pursue specific policies, and Taiwan is
the key to China’s diplomatic power in the region.81 Taiwan is strategically important to
America, and plays a vital role in the Asian economy. Taiwan is the third largest exporting
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country in the region, America’s ninth largest trading partner.”82 Maintaining Taiwan as an ally
would also provide the US with access to geostrategic chokepoints in the Asia region. It is in
close proximity to Japan’s main sea-lane and pathway to the Middle East, and a strategic access
point for trade and transportation in the Pacific Ocean for the US and East Asia as a whole.83
Taiwan and the US cooperate in defense and intelligence issues as well. Taiwan is one of
America’s biggest importers of defensive weapons. The selling and purchasing of fighter aircraft
has also opened up a new market for American products and labor in the country, improving
relations between Taiwan and the US.84
There are several problems with current US policy toward Taiwan. First, it was created to
maintain the “status quo.” The term “status quo,” however, has never been defined. Second,
Taiwan is a democracy, and therefore the Cold War strategy of deterrence is ineffective. The
current “one China” policy is also undermining the US’ ability to promote its national security
interests. In the past, the US has been able to set trends in economic and political policy. In order
to secure one of America’s most important democratic relationship in Asia, Washington must
increase their trade with Taiwan, and focus on strengthening various partnerships and cooperate
on non-defense type projects such as health, the environment, and humanitarian aid.85
Regional Integration
Globalization has caused nation-states to no longer be the only primary actors in the Asia
region. The globalization of the world and the ability to easily communicate with foreign
countries and foreign leaders has birthed an intricate connection between nations that is
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unprecedented. The instantaneous sharing of information through technology and the internet has
increasingly fueled globalization, and has provided the world’s eastern hemisphere with the tools
to rapidly grow and expand its sphere of influence. This has spurred many states to begin
investing time, energy, and resources into building multilateral and regional organizations such
as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization (SCO) to guarantee security from threatening non-state actors and to ensure border
security.86
Political and economic problems are more often than not agitators and motivators for
instability in the region. Regional integration, or regionalism, is an integral part of Asia,
especially in the area of politics.87 There has been a growing effort to focus on transnational
security and cooperation in Asia, and geopolitics has taken on an increasingly important role
over the past ten years in the Asia-Pacific region, due to the numerous traditional and
nontraditional threats that have begun to surface. The interdependency among Asian nations due
to trade, global capitalism, and commerce has shifted the focus from domestic concerns to
transnational security concerns. The Asia region’s “increasing interest in multilateral
cooperation,” has drawn international attention.88 The creation of ASEAN, the SCO, the East
Asia Summit, and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation are just a few yet prominent examples
of the region’s attempt to build a community and a regional identity.89
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As China increases its power and influence in the region, China and its neighbors are
creating allies of their own without US support or involvement. China is involved in multiple
regional security dialogues, including the APT, ASEAN Plus One, and the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization (SCO). Asia-Pacific countries do not necessarily consider China's growing power
to be negative as long as China is investing in other countries and becoming better integrated in
the international society. China’s neighbors hope that through security and economic integration,
China will be more willing to keep their interests in mind in accordance to the Regime Theory
which states that “mutual interests can instigate compliance with regime norms among
members.”90
The phenomenon of strategic assimilation within Asia is important to the US, because
these multilateral organizations and economic and political dialogues often exclude the US and
other Western countries. Ironically, although the majority of regional organizations in Asia
focused on conception to contain China and communism, Beijing has become one of the most
active participants in Asian regional dialogues.91 Although US presence has been appreciated in
the past, US presence in the region, especially military presence, has become viewed in a more
negative light. Catchy phrases such as “places, not bases,” has begun to circulate throughout the
region.92 Nevertheless, in recent years, Washington has appeared oblivious to the fact that they
are being precluded from discussions over key issues and concerns in the region. In order to
improve the overall economic and security issues in the Asia region, US policy makers must
proactively participate in core dialogues, and analyze and respond to the unique regional issues.
For the US to develop healthy relationship with China, they must first understand the Asia90
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Pacific region. This can be accomplished through actively investing in the region through
investing and participating in regional multilateral diplomatic discussions such as the Asian
Regional Forum and East Asia Summit and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations Plus
dialogues.93
The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)
China’s dynamic relationship with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)
and the Shanghai Corporation Organization (SCO), directly impacts how much leverage and
influence Beijing has with neighboring governments. The most recognized regional organization
in the Asia-Pacific region is ASEAN. ASEAN currently has ten members: Brunei Darussalam,
Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and
Vietnam.94 Accurately identifying and comprehending China’s strong rapport with members of
ASEAN, the SCO, and other regional organizations in the region is a vital step in pursuing
America’s best interest in the region. What has contributed to ASEAN’s ability to thrive has
been the agreement of non-interference and respect for sovereignty. This agreement is
documented in the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC). The US government signed the
TAC in order to demonstrate how serious the Obama Administration was on investing in the
Asia region. The signing of this treaty reflected the contrasting behavior between the current US
administration, and previous administrations. Former president Bush, weary of being regulated
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by the non-interventionist ASEAN Way, adamantly refused to sign the TAC. Bush believed that
not being able to act freely would not be in America’s best national interest.95
The maritime territory of the Association of the Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)
encompasses various economic strategic chokepoints. ASEAN’s compliance and defiance of
certain Chinese policies directly affect China’s international trade, territorial claims, and political
and military ambitions. ASEAN today has “emerged as a hub of regional multilateral
diplomacy,” and has expanded into a multifunctional union, forming a type of umbrella
organization. ASEAN currently encompasses many dialogues, including ASEAN Plus Three,
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, and the ASEAN Regional Forum.96 ASEAN has had the
most impact on Asian policy compared to any other regional security organization in the world,
including the United Nations.
Having recently celebrated its 43rd anniversary in 2010, ASEAN is currently dealing
with a vastly different state of affairs in the region than when it was first established. ASEAN is
no longer the only dominant regional organization in the region, and is now surrounded by
separate entities and organizations that are striving for similar security goals in the region, such
as the SCO. There are also several major dialogue forums such as the East Asia Summit, the
Trilateral Strategic Dialogue, and the Shangri-La Dialogue. China is the most dominant country
in the region, and is intimately involved in almost every one of these regional organizations.
These numerous institutions link almost every South Asian country together in one form or
another—whether it is economically, through defense and security cooperation, or by shared
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borders or sea. Aside from the US, China is the largest ASEAN trading partner, and the biggest
exporting target in Asia among the ASEAN members.97
Beijing is creating allies of its own, and will soon no longer need the US’ support to
maintain internal stability. China’s activities in the Asia-Pacific region have always been one of
concern for ASEAN members. For example, in the late 1990s, China invaded the Mischief Reef,
placing its soldiers on declared Filipino territory. Consequently, the Philippines became the first
“ASEAN member … directly involved in a military stand-off with China.”98 Afraid of offending
China, ASEAN was more concerned about China’s influence in the ASEAN Regional Forum
(ARF) and did not want to hurt their Sino-ASEAN relationship by confronting China over the
disputed Philippine islands. With the unpredictability of China’s actions, and more importantly
since it was the most significant contributor in the ARF, China simultaneously became ASEAN’s
strongest and “weakest link.”99
Some say that the ASEAN Regional Forum was created in 1994 exclusively for the
purpose of restraining China’s influence in the region.100 Although China is not a member of
ASEAN, it is an active member of the ASEAN Regional Forum. The majority of ASEAN
members have joined the organization out of necessity. Therefore it is very curious why China
joined the ARF, despite the international leverage and power that it already possessed.
According to the Modern Asian Studies journal, China was invited to join the ARF because
ASEAN assumed that America would eventually withdraw from the Asia-Pacific region.101 In
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addition, if China refused the offer to join the ARF, it would appear as if Beijing was actively
seeking to become a supreme isolationist hegemony in the region. With the absence of US
influence, it was assumed at the time that Japan would decide to grow militarily, and in response,
China would increase its power in the region, and no other country would have the ability to
restrain China or balance its power.102 China is no longer isolationist, and in the post-Cold War
era has become more aggressive in its policies. The question has become whether the ARF has
succeeded in better integrating China into the international community, or has created a powerhunger entity that has the proper tools to get what it wants. However, it is most likely that China
joined the ARF because it wanted to have a platform where it could influence the region’s
politics. Unlike ASEAN, the ARF is a unique structure that provides extra regional powers to
engage in discussions as well.103 If China succeeds in convincing other ASEAN members to
agree with its policies, Beijing will be able to more effectively resist pressures from the West,
especially in regards to amending China’s human rights policies.104 With the minimal role that
the US has played in the ARF, China has had a chance to influence the ARF's policies from
inside the organization.105
Joining the ARF was also a way of reassuring other states that China was willing to
cooperate with its neighbors. In addition, everything discussed and decided in the ARF would
directly affect China. It was in Beijing’s best interest to slip into a position where it could
“guide” the ARF in the right direction.106 Before joining the ARF, China was merely
economically interdependent with ASEAN members. Joining the ARF caused China to become
102
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linked to the region in the area of security and defense as well. According to the Regime Theory,
now that China was actively in dialogue with these other nations, Beijing not only had an
invested interest in protecting their own borders, but in providing for the national security of
their economic partners as well.107 In recent years, China has reached out to aid the
underdeveloped nation states in the region, and has generally respected each nation’s
sovereignty.108 This has improved Beijing’s reputation among ASEAN states that regard noninterference and sovereignty as the single most important aspect of multilateral foreign policy.
Joining the ARF has helped China to become more integrated into the global system.109 Overall,
there have been both positive and negative aspects to China’s membership in the ARF. Through
China’s membership and participation in the ARF, Beijing has become somewhat more
integrated with the international community and has on occasion cooperated with other
countries, staying open to dialogue. This is a significant improvement of attitude compared to
China’s foreign relations approach in the late 60s and early 70s.
According to Dr. Surin, Secretary-General of ASEAN, “China’s economic growth and
strong investment expansion is energizing the region and is providing ASEAN with a diversified
market in an environment of slowing growth in its traditional partners.”110 ASEAN planned to
create a China-ASEAN Free Trade Area (FTA) by 2010, and in January 2010, as planned, the
FTA was fully implemented.111 In 2008, China comprised “11.3% of total ASEAN trade.”112 Dr.
Surin sees this new FTA as very beneficial to ASEAN, and believes it will boost the
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organizations status in the region while politically and economically as well. “ASEAN needs to
organise and prepare itself in terms of a stable and hospitable investment climate, a well-trained
work-force and improved logistics to take advantage of the new investment prospects arising
from this next wave of China’s expansion.”113
China has invested billions of dollars in infrastructure projects among members of the
organization.114 Joining the ARF has provided China with the ability to significantly promote its
own agenda and convince other countries to accept their policies, without having to comply with
international norms. Although China has historically harbored some aggressive domestic and
international policies, President Hu’s administration has focused more on cooperation with its
neighbors and partners, and as a general rule has respected the sovereignty of its surrounding
nation states.115 Beijing has expressed an invested interest in its neighbors and has led
discussions on topics such as the denuclearization of North Korea.116 Hu’s policies closely align
with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations’ policy of noninterference and respect for a
nation’s sovereignty, referred to as the ASEAN Way. Hu has also increasingly participated in
multilateral discussions in an effort to engage in the international arena. This has helped calm
some ASEAN nation’s suspicions that China is becoming an Asian hegemony, seeking to
dominate the region. Hu’s rallying support of like-minded states is certainly serving Beijing’s
self-interest, and through emphasizing noninterference and respect for sovereignty, has created a
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way to keep other nations from pressuring and interfering in China’s human-rights violations, not
excluding the recent controversy over the imprisonment of Liu Xiaobo.117
The Shanghai Corporation Organization (SCO)
In addition to participating in multilateral discussions such as the ARF, China has made
further efforts to create a type of buffer against the US and Western influence in East Asia.118
The SCO, established in 2001, is a regional organizational alliance between Uzbekistan and the
Shanghai Five: Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and China. After the Cold War,
China was afraid that there would be a power-vacuum in Central Asia that would cause regional
instability. The close relationship between the “Shanghai Five” is beginning to fill the void that
was left in the area after the collapse of the USSR. The SCO has the capability to become the
most threatening, successful and powerful security organization in Asia.119 By establishing
relationships with Southeast Asia and the Asia-Pacific through ASEAN, and with East Asia
through the SCO, China has created a perfect lateral buffer zone against the US, surrounding
itself with allies with an invested interest in Beijing. China bellies that US influence in the area
challenges their “political and economic status quo.”120
Although SCO is roughly 10 years old, it has demonstrated competency in dealing with a
multitude of transnational and nontraditional issues such as terrorism and competition over
energy resources. SCO is not purely a security organization, but aims to enhance collaboration in
“trade, science and technology, culture, energy, and the environment” among its members.121
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The SCO has voiced support for the ARF and other Asia-Pacific multilateral organizations,
claiming to agree on security issues such as how to address the nuclearization and possible
unification of the Korean peninsula. However, it took the SCO an entire year to even issue a
statement on the 9/11 terrorist attack. Critics point out that SCO’s failure to make a statement
immediately as a unilateral body against the terrorist attack showed a lack of collaboration within
the organization.122
Similar to the ASEAN Way, SCO operates under what is called the “Shanghai Spirit”
when dealing with security and political relations within the region. The Shanghai Spirit
promotes an “international security co-operation based on equality, mutual trust and respect.”123
By treating each member with equality, SCO is making an effort to depart from the hierarchical
structure that is often seen in Western organizations. Nevertheless, the power gap between the
member countries in the organization forces some type of hierarchical structure.124 Although the
SCO functions in a similar fashion as ASEAN, they have not been as successful in bringing
nations together to participate in multinational dialogue to the extent that the Asian Pacific
organization has.
The SCO successfully extended their presence into the Asia region, while simultaneously
characterizing the West as a harmful force. American and Western presence has often been
blamed for local uprisings and protests, no matter how involved they were in reality. The SCO
has now attained the status of “an alternative force in regional co-operation.”125 Although the
SCO is rapidly rising to the status of a “balancing” power against the US in the region, the SCO
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must continue to focus on clear internal development and strengthen the governments of its core
members in order to adequately compete against the Western influence in Central and East Asia
and exercise adequate leverage.126 US policy makers must come to terms with the fact that
America is no longer the only body that is offering protection and assurance in regional security
in Asia. SCO is similar to ASEAN in that its members prefer their relationships to be “based on
cooperation and trust.” With China and Russia as its leaders, SCO is becoming an organization
that demands to be recognized. The region is full of historical baggage and maintaining regional
stability and security in spite of this is SCO’s goal. On June 17, 2009, the president of China, Hu
Jintao, and Russia’s Dmitry Medvedev came together to celebrate 60 years of multilateral
relations.127
U.S. Foreign Policy Recommendations
In the wake of the current financial crisis, Washington has had a rude awakening and is
coming to realize the strategic significance of the Asia region. China has had the perfect
opportunity to step in and act as a financial savior, keeping the Asian economy from collapsing
through various measures such as refusing to change the value of its currency.128 China has
exerted and expanded its influence in the region through providing financial assistance to its
neighbors, while Washington continues to drain its money and energy in the Middle East, and
spreading itself thin throughout the world.129 This has reinforced the feeling that the US is an
“outsider” with only selfish interests in the area.130 US foreign policy has been preoccupied with
126
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the Middle East over the past few years, and with the insecure dollar, the Asia region has started
to look towards China for assistance and assurance of economic security.
Need for Re-commitment
As she embarked on her tour of the Asia-Pacific region, Secretary of State Hillary
Clinton emphasized US commitment to the region and declared Washington’s primary goal was
“to sustain and strengthen America’s leadership in the Asia-Pacific region and to improve
security, heighten prosperity, and promote our values.”131 In February of this year, following his
trip to Southeast Asia, Kurt Campbell, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific
Affairs, stated “that the year 2011 is a ‘consequential year for American policy in the AsiaPacific region.’”132 The current administration has made several positive steps toward
reengaging in the region through participating in more regional and multinational dialogues. For
example the US participated in the East Asian Summit last year and has plans to attend this year,
and Washington is more actively involved in the ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting that was
recently established in 2006. The Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation is also scheduled to be
hosted by the US this year, demonstrating that Washington recognizes the importance of US
economic involvement in the region.
In order for the US to develop a strategic plan that is realistic and achievable and
ultimately “strengthen[s] America’s leadership in the region,” current policies and public
perception must be constantly cross referenced with facts. Although the US is, and will continue
to be, the world’s economic leader, China is rapidly rising to the forefront of global influence.
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The US must quickly adapt to the changes, recognize the trends, and respond in a way that will
guide China in the direction that will help Washington achieve its foreign policy objectives while
protecting the American people and maintaining stability in the Asia region. For the US to build
a thriving relationship with the Asia-Pacific region, it must study and understand the economic
needs and political desires of millions of people. This is no easy task. The Asia-Pacific region is
growing economically dependent on China, and China’s rapid growth and political leverage
should be seen as a threat to the US. The US’ recommitment to the Asia-Pacific region is
strategically important, and America must realize that the perfect balance between diplomacy
and military reinforcement is the best policy when dealing with the Asia-Pacific region. A good
example of a balanced relationship between the US and an Asian country is between South
Korea and the US. After the Korean War, the Republic of Korea (South Korea) and the US
signed the 1953 Mutual Defense Treaty, where both nations pledged to actively pursue “a more
comprehensive and effective system of regional security” in the Asia-Pacific region.133 The US
also heavily engages with South Korea economically and diplomatically, demonstrated by the
active negotiations over the Republic of Korea- United States Free Trade Agreement (KORUS).
Although this agreement is still un-ratified, it has been constantly negotiated over for the past
several years, indicating a desire by both parties to strengthen their economic relationship.134 The
KORUS is also important because it could provide a possible venue for pressuring corrupt and
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unstable regimes in the region, such as North Korea, to pursue more regionally beneficial
policies.135
The US should view China’s rise in the Asia region as an opportunity to participate in
more economic and political dialogue with Beijing. For America to successfully engage itself in
the Asia-Pacific region, it needs to do two things: First, look at Asia as a whole, and second,
simultaneously treat each nation as a unique entity that is contributing to the whole. China’s
presence and activities are very significant to the Asia-Pacific region and understanding the
desires and role of every member of ASEAN is an important step to understanding China. A
strong relationship with more Asian countries, and US participation in numerous Asian
economic and political forums is important, because in the future, any nation in the area may
become a strategic access point to a crisis in the region. For example, current US military
presence and diplomatic relationship with both Japan and South Korea has led to increased
multilateral cooperation between the countries, demonstrated by recent US-Japan and US-South
Korea joint military exercises.136 These bilateral relationships have become increasingly
important, especially with the current tense relationship between China and Taiwan, and the
instability of the North Korean government.137
The People’s Republic of China is becoming the most powerful country in Asia, and has
become an indispensable political and economic force in the region. The US must become more
politically and economically involved in the Asia region, change its foreign policy in a way that
reflects a comprehensive understanding of China and its role in the region, while proactively
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pursuing strategic relationships and dialogue among Asian countries. Kurt Campbell, in his most
recent trip to Southeast Asia, reconfirmed the region’s economic importance to the US, and the
US responsibility to encourage economic growth and “help with [its] economic recovery.”138 The
current Obama administration should continue to encourage transparency in China’s economic
policies.139 Significant progress in economic relations has been made between the US and China
since the normalization of relations between the two countries in 1969.140 However, the US still
holds several sanctions over China due to their human rights violations and their “threat of
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.”141 Currently, the majority of economic restrictions
focus on restricting Chinese exports and imports of defense and military materials. Although the
current economic sanctions are warranted, any additions to the sanctions should be thoroughly
reviewed before being put into effect in order to optimize Chinese-US relations. The US should
avoid isolationist or protectionist trends, or promotion of sanctions toward China that will
ultimately weaken the US economic and political reputation in the region.142 If the US continues
its current policy toward Asia and China, the rise of China and its proactive engagement with its
Asian neighbors will soon overshadow US influence in Asia. While the US must increase its
involvement in the region, it must also be very careful that Beijing does not interpret reengagement as “an effort to pit the countries in Asia against China.143
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During her first official overseas trip after being appointed as U.S. Secretary of State,
Hilary Clinton declared in Thailand that “The US is back,” reflecting the Obama administration’s
pledge to re-engage itself in Asia.144 By traveling first to the Asia-Pacific region, her trip was a
direct message to the world that America was going to re-invest in the region. Secretary Clinton
has been very faithful in attending almost every important diplomatic and strategic meeting in
Asia. President Barack Obama visited China in 2009 and discussed increasing cooperation, and
building trust. Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates just recently traveled to China and had an in
high-level conversation about military cooperation with President Hu Jintao. However, paying
lip service to the media and public officials about greater cooperation and seeking mutual
interests will not result in achieving anything significant on the other side of the world. It is
crucial that Washington learns to strategically communicate with China and its neighbors. It was,
and still is, in the US’ national security interest to encourage and promote an Asian security
environment that will not be a threat to the US, both domestically and internationally.
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